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Abstract
Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C. [Kri02].
Nowadays, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly
used in various applications, including high performance computing [BAGS02].
Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various se-
curity requirements of these electronic transactions, in particular to ensure
privacy. Brandt [Bra06] developed a protocol that computes the winner using
homomorphic operations on a distributed ElGamal encryption of the bids. He
claimed that it ensures full privacy of the bidders, i.e. no information apart
from the winner and the winning price is leaked. We first show that this pro-
tocol – when using malleable interactive zero-knowledge proofs – is vulnera-
ble to attacks by dishonest bidders. Such bidders can manipulate the publicly
available data in a way that allows the seller to deduce all participants’ bids.
We provide an efficient parallelized implementation of the protocol and the
attack to show its practicality. Additionally we discuss some issues with ver-
ifiability as well as attacks on non-repudiation, fairness and the privacy of
individual bidders exploiting authentication problems.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are a simple method to sell goods and services. Typically a seller of-
fers a good or a service, and the bidders make offers. Depending on the type of
auction, the offers might be sent using sealed envelopes which are opened simulta-
neously to determine the winner (the “sealed-bid” auction), or an auctioneer could
announce prices decreasingly until one bidder is willing to pay the announced price
(the “dutch auction”). Additionally there might be several rounds, or offers might
be announced publicly directly (the “English” or “shout-out” auction). The winner
usually is the bidder submitting the highest bid, but in some cases he might only
have to pay the second highest offer as a price (the “second-price”- or “Vickrey”-
Auction). In general a bidder wants to win the auction at the lowest possible price,
and the seller wants to sell his good at the highest possible price. For more in-
formation on different auction methods see [Kri02]. To address this huge variety
of possible auction settings and to achieve different security and efficiency proper-
ties numerous protocols have been developed, e.g. [Bra06, CPS07, NPS99, OM01,
PBDV02, SSS02, Sak00] and references therein.
One of the many applications of auctions lies is in the context of distributed
scheduling of jobs for high performance computing grids [BAGS02, AGG+05]. In
this and other applications, one of the key security requirements of electronic auc-
tion (e-Auction) protocols is privacy, i.e. the bids of losing bidders remain private
as they can contain sensitive information. For example, in the case of a grid shared
between multiple companies, the job meta-data (length, resource requirements, as
well as the offered payment) can leak sensitive information to competitors about
the nature, content or importance of the computation: if the job is very important,
a company might be willing to pay more even for a small job, or changes in the job
types might indicate that the company is developing new computation methods.
Moreover, the offered prices might leak information about the bidders’ strategies
(in particular in multi-round auctions) or their financial status.
Brandt proposed a first-price sealed-bid auction protocol [Bra06, Bra03, Bra02]
and claimed that it is fully private, i.e. it leaks no information apart from the winner,
the winning bid, and what can be deduced from these two facts (for example that
the other bids were lower).
Our Contributions. The protocol is based on an algorithm that computes the
winner using bids encoded as bit vectors. In this paper we show that the imple-
mentation using the homomorphic property of a distributed Elgamal encryption
proposed in the original paper suffers from a weakness. In fact, we prove that any
two different inputs (i.e. different bids) result in different outcome values, which
are only hidden using random values. We show how a dishonest participant can re-
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move this random noise, if malleable interactive zero-knowledge proofs are used.
The seller can then efficiently compute the bids of all bidders, hence completely
breaking privacy. We provide a parallel implementation for the protocol and the
attack, and show that the computations are efficient in practice. We also discuss
two problems with verifiability, and how the lack of authentication enables attacks
on privacy even if the above attack is prevented via non-malleable non-interactive
proofs. Additionally we show attacks on non-repudiation and fairness, and propose
solutions to all discovered flaws in order to recover a fully resistant protocol.
A preliminary version of this paper was presented in [DDL13], with a the-
oretical attack of complexity O(n2k2) where n is the number of bidders and k
the number of possible bids. In this paper we correct an error in the attack given
in [DDL13] and present an improved attack of complexity only O(nk). We also
give a detailed description of the new efficient algorithm, and present a practical
performance evaluation on realistic inputs: With thousands of different bids and
bidders, we were able to break the privacy of the original protocol in a few seconds
on a 32 cores shared memory machine.
Outline. In the next section, we recall the protocol of Brandt. Then, in the fol-
lowing sections, we present our attacks in several steps. In Section 3, we first study
the protocol using interactive zero-knowledge proofs and without random noise.
Then we show how a dishonest participant can remove the noise, thus mount the
attack on the protocol with noise, and discuss countermeasures. Finally, in Sec-
tion 4, we discuss verifiability and in Section 5 we discuss attacks on fairness,
non-repudiation and privacy exploiting the lack of authentication.
2 The Protocol
The protocol of Brandt [Bra06] was designed to ensure full privacy in a completely
distributed way. It exploits the homomorphic properties of a distributed El-Gamal
encryption scheme [EG85] for a secure multi-party computation of the winner.
Then it uses zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms to ensure
correctness of the bids while preserving privacy. We first give a high level descrip-
tion of the protocol and then present details on its main cryptographic primitives.
2.1 Informal Description
The participating n bidders and the seller communicate essentially using broadcast
messages. The latter can for example be implemented using a bulletin board, i.e.
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an append-only memory accessible to everybody. The bids are encoded as k-bit-
vectors where each entry corresponds to a price. If the bidder a wants to bid the
price bida, all entries will be 1, except the entry bida which will be Y (a public
constant). Each entry of the vector is then encrypted separately using a n-out-
of-n-encryption scheme set up by all bidders. The bidders use multiplications of
the encrypted values to compute one value vaj for each price, by exploiting the
homomorphic property of the encryption scheme. Each one of this values (vaj) is
1 if the bidder awins at price j, and is a random number otherwise. The decryption
of the final values takes place in a distributed way to ensure that nobody can access
intermediate values.
2.2 Mathematical Description (Brandt [Bra06])
Let Gq be a multiplicative subgroup of order q, prime, and g a generator of the
group. We consider that i, h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j, bida ∈ {1, . . . , k} (where bida is
the bid chosen by the bidder with index a), Y ∈ Gq \ {1}. More precisely, the n
bidders execute the following five steps of the Brandt’s protocol [Bra06]:
1. Key Generation
Each bidder a, whose bidding price is bida among {1, . . . , k} does the fol-
lowing:
• chooses a secret xa ∈ Z/qZ
• chooses randomly maij and raj ∈ Z/qZ for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
• publishes ya = gxa and proves the knowledge of ya’s discrete loga-
rithm
• using all the published yi, then computes y =
∏n
i=1 yi.
2. Bid Encryption
Each bidder a knows the public value Y and
• for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k} sets baj =
{
Y if j = bida
1 otherwise
• publishes αaj = baj · yraj and βaj = graj for each j
• proves that for all j, logg(βaj) equals logy(αaj) or logy
(αaj
Y
)
, and that
logy
(∏k
j=1 αaj
Y
)
= logg
 k∏
j=1
βaj

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3. Outcome Computation
• Each bidder a computes and publishes for all i and j:
γaij =
 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
αhd
 ·(j−1∏
d=1
αid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
αhj
)maij
δaij =
 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
βhd
 ·(j−1∏
d=1
βid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
βhj
)maij
and proves its correctness.
4. Outcome Decryption
• Each bidder a sends φaij = (
n∏
h=1
δhij)
xa for each i and j to the seller
and proves its correctness. After having received all values, the seller
publishes φhij for all i, j, and h 6= i.
5. Winner determination
• Everybody can now compute vaj =
∏n
i=1 γ
i
aj∏n
i=1 φ
i
aj
for each j.
• If vaw = 1 for some w, then the bidder a wins the auction at price pw.
2.3 Malleable proofs of knowledge and discrete logarithms
In the original paper [Bra06] the author suggests using zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge to protect against active adversaries. The basic protocols he proposes
are interactive and malleable, but can be converted into non-interactive proofs us-
ing the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86], as advised by the author. We first recall the
general idea of such proofs, then we expose the man-in-the-middle attacks on the
interactive version of the zero-knowledge proofs, which we will use as part of our
first attack on Brandt’s protocol in Section 3.1.
Let PDL denote a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm. A first scheme
for PDL was developed in 1986 by Chaum et al. [CEvdGP86]. In the original
auction paper [Bra06] Brandt proposes to use a non-interactive variant of PDL as
developed by Schnorr [Sch91], which are malleable. Unfortunately, interactive
malleable PDL are subject to man-in-the-middle attacks [Kat02]. Many PDL’s are
obtained via three-move structure protocols (commitment, challenge and response)
called Σ-protocols. We first recall the classic Σ-protocol for PDL, on a group with
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generator g and order q [BCM05, BDPW89, CEvdG87]: Peggy and Victor know
v and g, but only Peggy knows x, so that v = gx. She can prove this fact, without
revealing x, by executing the following protocol:
1. (commitment) Peggy chooses r at random and sends z = gr to Victor.
2. (challenge) Victor chooses a challenge c at random and sends it to Peggy.
3. (response) Peggy sends s = (r + c · x) mod q to Victor.
4. Victor checks that gs = z · vc.
2.3.1 Generalization of Katz’ man-in-the-middle attack on interactive PDL
Suppose Peggy possesses some secret discrete logarithm x. We present here first
the man-in-the-middle attack of [Kat02], and then generalize it to any affine trans-
form of a secret discrete logarithm. In this attack, an attacker can pretend to have
knowledge of any affine combination of the secret x, even providing the associ-
ated proof of knowledge, without breaking the discrete logarithm. To prove this
possession to say Victor, the attacker will start an interactive proof knowledge ses-
sion with Peggy and another one with Victor. The attacker will transform Peggy’s
outputs and forward Victor’s challenges to her. The idea of [Kat02] is to use the
proof of possession of Peggy’s x, to prove possession of 1 − x to Victor. Indeed
to prove for instance possession of just x to Victor, an attacker would only have
to forward Peggy’s messages to Victor and Victor’s messages to Peggy. The idea
of the attack is similar, except that one needs to modify the messages of Peggy.
We show the example of 1 − x in Figure 1 since it is used in Section 3.4 to
mount our attack. Upon demand by Victor to prove knowledge of 1 − x, Mal-
lory, the man-in-the-middle, simply starts a proof of knowledge of x with Peggy.
Peggy chooses a random exponent r and sends the commitment z = gr to Mal-
lory. Mallory simply inverts z and sends y = z−1 to Victor. Then Victor presents
a challenge c that Mallory simply forwards without modification to Peggy. Fi-
nally Peggy sends a response s that Mallory combines with c, as u = c − s, to
provide a correct answer to Victor. This is summarized in Figure 1. Victor is
convinced by Mallory’s proof since we have gs = gr+c·x = grgx·c = zvc and
gu = gc−s = gc−(r+c·x) = g−rg(1−x)·c = z−1(gv−1)c = ywc.
Now we show in Lemma 1 that it is possible to adapt the attack to make it
work in the generic settings of [BDPW89, Mau09] or of Σ-protocols [CD98]. We
use this generalization to prevent possible countermeasures of our first attack in
Section 3.7.
We let f : Γ → Ω denote a one way homomorphic function between two
commutative groups (Γ,+) and (Ω,×). For an integral value α, α · x ∈ Γ (resp.
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Peggy Mallory V ictor
Secret : x
Public : g, v = gx g, w = gv−1 g
z = gr
1 : z // y = z−1
1′ : y //
c
2 : coo c
2′ : coo
s = r + c · x 3 : s // u = c− s 3
′ : u //
Check : gs
?
== z · vc gu ?== y · wc
Figure 1: [Kat02] Man-in-the-middle PDL of 1 − x, with x an unknown discrete
logarithm.
yα ∈ Ω) denotes α applications of the group law + (resp. ×). For a secret x ∈
Γ, and any (h, α, β) ∈ Γ × Z2, the attacker can build a proof of possession of
α · h+ β · x. In the setting of the example of Figure 1, we used f(x) = gx, h = 1,
α = 1 and β = −1.
In the general case also, upon demand of proof by Victor, Mallory starts a proof
with Peggy. The secret of Peggy is x, and the associated witness v is v = f(x).
Then Mallory wants to prove that his witness w corresponds to any combination of
x with a logarithm h that he knows. With only public knowledge and his chosen
(h, α, β) ∈ Γ × Z2, Mallory is able to compute w = f(h)α · vβ . For the proof of
knowledge, Mallory still modifies the commitment z = f(r) of Peggy to y = zβ .
Mallory forwards the challenge c of Victor without modification. Finally Mallory
transforms the response s of Peggy, still with only public knowledge and his chosen
(h, α, β) ∈ Γ×Z2, as u = c · (α · h) + β · s. We summarize this general attack on
Figure 2.
Lemma 1. In the generalized man-in-the-middle attack described above (cf. Fig-
ure 2) on the interactive proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm, Victor is con-
vinced by Mallory’s proof of knowledge of α · h+ β · x.
Proof. Indeed,
u = c · (α ·h) +β · s = c · (α ·h) +β · (r+ c ·x) = β · r+ c · (α ·h+β ·x). (1)
Now, since z = f(r), y = zβ , v = f(x) and f(h)α × vβ = w, the latter Equa-
tion (1) proves in turn that
f(u) = f(r)β × f(α · h+ β · x)c = zβ × (f(h)α × f(x)β)c = y × wc. (2)
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Peggy Mallory V ictor
Secret : x ∈ Γ (h, α, β) ∈ Γ× Z2
Public : v = f(x) w = f(h)α × vβ f
z = f(r)
1 : z // y = zβ
1′ : y //
c
2 : coo c
2′ : coo
s = r + c · x 3 : s // u = c · (α · h) + β · s 3
′ : u //
Check : f(s)
?
== z × vc f(u) ?== y × wc
Figure 2: Man-in-the-middle attack proving knowledge of any affine transform of
a secret discrete logarithm in the generic setting.
Now Victor has to verify the commitment-challenge-response (y, c, u) of Mallory
for his witnessw. Then Victor needs to checks whether f(u) corresponds to y×wc,
which is the case as shown by the latter Equation (2).
2.3.2 Generalizations to equality of discrete logarithms
We let EQDL denote a proof of equality of several discrete logarithms. Any PDL
can in general easily be transformed to an EQDL by applying it k times on the
same witness. It is often more efficient to combine the application in one as in
[CP92, CMW10], or more generally as composition of Σ-protocols, here with two
logarithms and two generators g1 and g2. Peggy wants to prove that she knows x
such that v = gx1 and w = g
x
2 :
1. Peggy chooses r at random and sends λ = gr1 and µ = g
r
2 to Victor.
2. Victor chooses a challenge c at random and sends it to Peggy.
3. Peggy computes s = (r + c · x) mod q and sends it to Victor.
4. Victor tests if gs1 = λ · vc and gs2 = µ · wc.
This protocol remains malleable, and the previous attacks are still valid since the
response remains of the form r + c · x.
2.3.3 Countermeasures
Direct countermeasures to the above attacks are to use non-interactive and/or non-
malleable proofs:
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• An interactive protocol can be converted into a non-interactive one using
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86]. In this case the challenge is computed as a
cryptographic hash of all previous values, and is not submitted by the verifier.
This makes it impossible for Mallory to choose the challenge according to
his needs (since for him the previous values and hence the hash are different),
which prevents the attack.
• Also the first PDL by [CEvdGP86] uses bit-flipping, and more generally
non-malleable protocols like [FF09] could be used.
We will show in the following that if the proofs proposed in the original paper
are not converted into non-interactive proofs, there is an attack on privacy. Note
that even if non-interactive non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs are used, a ma-
licious attacker in control of the network can nonetheless recover any bidder’s bid
as the messages are not authenticated, as we show in Section 5.
3 Attacking the fully private computations
The first attack we present uses some algebraic properties of the computations per-
formed during the protocol execution. More precisely, it relies on the fact that the
outcome computation function is invertible, apart from some added random noise.
In the following, we prove that the function without random noise is injective, and
give an algorithm to invert it. Then we show that an attacker can actually remove
the random noise, and that this is unnoticeable to the other participants if mal-
leable zero-knowledge proofs are used. Finally we give a detailed description of
the attack, and discuss countermeasures.
3.1 Analysis of the outcome computation
The idea is to analyze the computations done in Step 3 of the protocol. Consider
the following example with three bidders and three possible prices. Then the first
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bidder computes
γ111 = ( (α12 · α13· α22 · α23· α32 · α33) · (1) · (1) )m
1
11
γ112 = ( (α13· α23· α33) · (α11) · (1) )m
1
12
γ113 = ( (1) · (α11 · α12) · (1) )m
1
13
γ121 = ( (α12 · α13· α22 · α23· α32 · α33) · (1) · (α11) )m
1
21
γ122 = ( (α13· α23· α33) · (α21) · (α12) )m
1
22
γ123 = ( (1) · (α21 · α22) · (α13) )m
1
23
γ131 = ( (α12 · α13· α22 · α23· α32 · α33) · (1) · (α11 · α21) )m
1
31
γ132 = ( (α13· α23· α33) · (α31) · (α12 · α22) )m
1
32
γ133 = ( (1) · (α31 · α32) · (α13 · α23) )m
1
33
The second and third bidder do the same computations, but using different random
valuesmaij . Since each αij is either the encryption of 1 or Y , for example the value
γ122 will be an encryption of 1 only if
• nobody submitted a higher bid (the first block) and
• bidder 2 did not bid a lower bid (the second block) and
• no bidder with a lower index submitted the same bid (the third block).
If we ignore the exponentiation by maij , each γ
a
ij is the encryption of the product of
several bij’s. Each bij can be either 1 or Y , hence (γaij)
−maij will be the encryption
of a value Y lij , where 0 ≤ lij ≤ n. The lower bound of lij is trivial, the upper
bound follows from the observation that each αij will be used at most once, and
that each bidder will encrypt Y at most once.
Assume for now that we know all lij . We show next that this is sufficient to
obtain all bids. Consider the function f which takes as input the following vector1:
b = logY
((
b11, . . . , b1k, b21, . . . , b2k, . . . , bn1, . . . , bnk
)T)
,
and returns the values lij . The input vector is thus a vector of all bid-vectors, where
1 is replaced by 0 and Y by 1. Consider our above example with three bidders and
three possible prices, then we have:
b = logY
((
b11, b12, b13, b21, b22, b23, b31, b32, b33
)T)
.
A particular instance where bidder 1 and 3 submit price 1, and bidder 2 submits
price 2 would then look as: b =
(
1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0
)T .
1By abuse of notation we write logs
(
x1, . . . , xn
)
for
(
logs(x1), . . . , logs(xn)
)
.
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Hence only the factors α11, α22 and α31 are encryptions of Y , all other α’s are
encryptions of 1. By simply counting how often the factors α11, α22 and α31
show up in each equation as described above, we can compute the following re-
sult: f(b) =
(
1, 1, 1, 2, 0, 1, 2, 1, 1
)T . Note that since we
chose the input of f to be a bit-vector, we have to simply count the ones (which
correspond to Y ’s) in particular positions in b, where the positions are determined
by the factors inside γaij . Hence we can express f as a matrix, i.e. f(b) = M · b for
the following matrix M :
f(b) = M · b =

0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0

·

1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0

=

1
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
1

To see how the matrix M is constructed, consider for example (γa22)
−ma22 = (α13 ·
α23 ·α33) ·(α21) ·(α12) which corresponds to the second row in the second vertical
block:
• α12 and α13; hence the two ones at position 2 and 3 in the first horizontal
block
• α21 and α23; hence the two ones at position 1 and 3 in the second horizontal
block
• α33; hence the one at position 3 in the third horizontal block
More generally, we can see that each 3×3 block consists of potentially three parts:
• An upper triangular matrix representing all bigger bids.
• On the block diagonal we add a lower triangular matrix representing a lower
bid by the same bidder,
• In the lower left half we add an identity matrix representing a bid at the
current price by a bidder with a lower index.
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This corresponds exactly to the structure of the products inside each γaij . It is also
equivalent to formula (1) in Section 4.1.1 of the original paper [Bra06] without the
random matrix R∗k. In the following we prove that the function f is injective. We
then discuss how this function can be efficiently inverted (i.e. how to compute the
bids when knowing all lij’s).
3.2 Linear algebra toolbox
Let Ik be the k × k identity matrix; let Lk be a lower k × k triangular matrix with
zeroes on the diagonal, ones in the lower part and zeroes elsewhere; and let Uk be
an upper k × k triangular matrix with zeroes on the diagonal, ones in the upper
part, and zeroes elsewhere:
Ik =

1 0 · · · 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 1
 Lk =

0 0 · · · 0
1
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
1 · · · 1 0
 Uk =

0 1 · · · 1
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 1
0 · · · 0 0

By abuse of notation we use I , L and U to denote respectively Ik, Lk and Uk.
For a k × k-matrix Mk we define (Mk)r = Mk · · ·Mk (r times) and (Mk)0 = Ik.
Let (e1, . . . , ek) be the canonical basis.
The matrix U (resp L) are called strictly upper (lower) triangular and are de-
fined such as for all i ≤ j (resp j ≤ i) Uij = 0. (resp Lij = 0).
Lemma 2. Matrices Lk and Uk are nilpotent, i.e. (Uk)k = 0 and (Lk)k = 0.
Proof. We only do the proof for a strictly upper triangular matrix U , the proof for
a strictly lower triangular matrix is similar. We prove by induction that Ukij = 0
for i > j − k, this implies that if U is of size m ×m then for all k ≥ m we have
Uk = 0. We prove this result by induction on the exponent of U :
• base case: U1ij = 0 for all i > j − 1, since by definition of U for all i ≤ j
we have Uij = 0.
• induction step: We assume that Uk−1ij = 0 for all i > j − (k − 1), we prove
that Ukij = 0 holds for all i > j−(k−1). By definition of the matrix product
12
we have:
Ukij = (UU
k−1)ij
=
m∑
r=1
UirU
k−1
rj
=
i∑
r=1
UirU
k−1
rj +
m∑
r=i+1
UirU
k−1
rj
=
i∑
r=1
0 · Uk−1rj +
m∑
r=i+1
Uir · 0
= 0.
In the first sum we have Uir = 0 since r ≤ i and since U is strictly upper
triangular. In the second sum, we apply the induction hypothesis with r ≥
i+ 1 > (j − k) + 1 = j − (k − 1) to obtain Uk−1rj = 0.
Lemma 3. Let w = (w1, . . . , wk), if
∑k
j=1wj = 1 then we have Lk · w =
(1, . . . , 1)T − (Ik + Uk) · w.
Proof. First note that since
∑k
j=1wj = 1,
Lk · w =

0 0 · · · 0
1
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
1 · · · 1 0
 ·
w1...
wk
 =

0
w1
w1 + w2
...∑k−1
j=1 wj
 =

1−∑kj=1wj
1−∑kj=2wj
...
1− wk

On the other hand, if we let 1 = (1, . . . , 1)T , we have also:
1− (Ik + Uk) · w = 1−

1 1 · · · 1
0 1
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 1
0 · · · 0 1
 ·
w1...
wk
 =

1−∑kj=1wj
1−∑kj=2wj
...
1− wk

Lemma 4. For z = ei − ej , we have that (Lk + Uk) · z = −z.
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Proof. If i = j, then z = 0 and the results is true. Suppose w.l.o.g. that i > j
(otherwise we just prove the result for −z). Then
Uk · (ei − ej) =
i−1∑
s=1
es −
j−1∑
s=1
es =
i−1∑
s=j
es.
Similarly
Lk · (ei − ej) =
k∑
s=i+1
es −
k∑
s=j+1
es =
i∑
s=j+1
−es.
Therefore
(Lk + Uk) · (ei − ej) =
i−1∑
s=j
es −
i∑
s=j+1
es = ej − ei = −z.
3.3 How to recover the bids when knowing the lij’s
As discussed above, we can represent the function f as a matrix multiplication. Let
M be the following square matrix of size nk × nk:
M =

(U + L) U . . . . . . U
(U + I) (U + L) U . . . U
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
(U + I) . . . (U + I) (U + L) U
(U + I) . . . . . . (U + I) (U + L)
 . Then f(b) = M ·b.
The function takes as input a vector composed of n vectors, each of k bits. It returns
the nk values lij , 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ k. As explained above, the structure of
the matrix is defined by the formula that computes γaij , which consists essentially of
three factors: first we multiply all αij which encode bigger bids (represented by the
matrix U ), then we multiply all αij which encode smaller bids by the same bidder
(represented by adding the matrix L on the diagonal), and finally we multiply by
all αij which encode the same bid by bidders with a smaller index (represented by
adding the matrix I on the lower triangle of M ). In our encoding there will be a
“1” in the vector for each Y in the protocol, hence f will count how many Y s are
multiplied when computing γaij .
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Example 5 (f in the case of two bidders and two prices). In the case of two bidders
and two possible prices, we obtain the following matrix M :
M =

0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0

In this example, we have four possible cases for the bids:
b0 =

1
0
1
0
 , b1 =

1
0
0
1
 , b2 =

0
1
1
0
 , b3 =

0
1
0
1

We can compute f for all cases:
f(b0) =

0
1
1
1
 , f(b1) =

1
1
2
0
 , f(b2) =

1
0
1
2
 , f(b3) =

2
0
2
1

In this example it is easy to see that for all i 6= j we have f(bi) 6= f(bj), even if
the the winner and the winning price is the same, as for example in the case of b2
and b3.
In general, we can prove the following theorem stating that f is injective.
Theorem 6. f is injective on valid bid vectors, i.e. for two different correct bid
vectors u = [u1, . . . , uk]T and v = [v1, . . . , vk]T with u 6= v we have M · u 6=
M · v.
Proof. Let u and v be two correct bid vectors such that u 6= v. We want to prove
that M · u 6= M · v. We make a proof by contradiction, hence we assume that
M · u = M · v or that M · (u − v) = 0. Because u and v are two correct
bid vectors, each one of them is an element of the canonical basis (e1, . . . , ek),
i.e. u = ei and v = ej , as shown in Section 3.1. We denote u − v by z, and
consequently z = ei − ej . Knowing that M · z = 0, we prove by induction on a
that for all a the following property P (a) holds:
P (a) : ∀l, 0 < l ≤ a, diag(Uk−l) · z = 0
where diag(Uk−x) is a nk × nk block diagonal matrix containing only diagonal
blocks of the same matrix Uk−x. The validity of P (k) proves in particular that
diag(U0) · zl = 0, i.e. z = 0 which contradicts our hypothesis.
15
• Case a = 1: we also prove this base case by induction, i.e. for all b ≥ 1 the
property Q(b) holds, where:
Q(b) : ∀m, 0 < m ≤ b, Uk−1 · zm = 0
which gives us that Uk−1 · z = 0.
– Base case b = 1: We start by looking at the multiplication of the first
row of M with z. We obtain:
(L+ U) · z1 + U · (z2 + . . .+ zk) = 0.
We can multiply each side by Uk−1, and use Lemma 4 to obtain:
Uk−1 · [−z1 + U · (z2 + . . .+ zk)] = 0.
Since U is nilpotent, according to Lemma 2 the latter gives −Uk−1 ·
z1 = 0. Hence we know Q(1) : Uk−1 · z1 = 0, i.e. the last entry of z1
is 0.
– Inductive step b+ 1: assume Q(b). Consider now the multiplication of
the (b+ 1)-th row of the matrix M :
(U+I)·z1+. . .+(U+I)·zb+(L+U)·zb+1+U ·(zb+2+. . .+zk) = 0.
Then by multiplying by Uk−1 and using Lemma 4 we obtain:
Uk−1 ·[(U+I)·z1+. . .+(U+I)·zb−zb+1+U ·(zb+2+. . .+zk)] = 0.
Since U is nilpotent according to Lemma 2 we have
Uk−1 · z1 + . . .+ Uk−1 · zb − Uk−1 · zb+1 = 0.
Using the fact that for all m < b we have Uk−1 · zm = 0, the latter
gives −Uk−1 · zb+1 = 0.
• Inductive step a+1: assume P (a). By induction on b ≥ 1 we will show that
Q′(b) holds, where
Q′(b) : ∀m, 0 < m ≤ b, Uk−(a+1) · zm = 0
which gives us that Uk−(a+1) · z = 0, i.e. P (a+ 1).
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– Base case b = 1: Consider the multiplication of the first row with
Uk−(a+1):
Uk−(a+1) · [(L+ U) · z1 + U · (z2 + . . .+ zk)] = 0
which can be rewritten as
−Uk−(a+1) · z1 + Uk−a · (z2 + . . .+ zk) = 0.
Using Uk−a ·zl = 0 for all l, we can conclude that−Uk−(a+1) ·z1 = 0,
i.e. Q′(1) holds.
– Inductive step b + 1: assume Q′(b). Consider now the (b + 1)-th row
of the matrix M :
(U+I)·z1+. . .+(U+I)·zb+(L+U)·zb+1+U ·(zb+2+. . .+zk) = 0.
Then by multiplying by Uk−(a+1) and using Lemma 4 we obtain:
Uk−(a+1)·[(U+I)·z1+. . .+(U+I)·zb−zb+1+U ·(zb+2+. . .+zk)] = 0.
Using Uk−a · zl = 0 for all l, we can conclude that
Uk−(a+1) · z1 + . . .+ Uk−(a+1) · zb − Uk−(a+1) · zb+1 = 0.
Now, for all m < b, we have Uk−(a+1) · zm = 0, so that −Uk−(a+1) ·
zb+1 = 0; i.e. Q′(b+ 1) holds.
This theorem shows that if there is a constellation of bids that led to certain
values lij , this constellation is unique. Hence we are able to invert f on valid
outputs. We will now show that this can be efficiently done.
3.3.1 Recursive formulae for the bids
Our aim is to solve the following linear system: M · x = l. We will use the same
steps we used for the proof of injectivity to solve this system efficiently. Consider
the r-th block of size k of the latter system. We have xr = (xr,1, xr,2, . . . , xr,k)
and the r-th block of M · x is
(U + I)x1 + . . .+ (U + I)xr−1 + (L+ U)xr + Uxr+1 + . . .+ Uxn
= U(
n∑
i=1
xi) + (
r−1∑
i=1
xi) + Lxr.
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As the r-th block of l is lr, we thus have:
U
(
n∑
i=1
xi
)
+
r−1∑
i=1
xi + Lxr = lr
Using Lemma 3, with wj = xr,j for j = 1..k, we can exchange L in the latter
to get
U
(
n∑
i=1
xi
)
+
r−1∑
i=1
xi + (1− (I + U)xr) = lr.
Hence,
U
(
n∑
i=1
xi
)
+
r−1∑
i=1
xi + 1− xr − Uxr = lr,
so that we now have:
x1 = 1− l1 + U
(
n∑
i=2
xi
)
xr = 1− lr +
r−1∑
i=1
xi + U
 n∑
i=1,i 6=r
xi
 if 1 < r ≤ n (3)
This gives us a formula to compute the values of xi,j , starting with the last
element of the first block x1,k. Then we can compute the last elements of all other
blocks x2,k, . . . , xn,k, and then the second to last elements x1,k−1, . . . , xn,k−1, etc.
The idea is to project the above Equation (3) on the t-th coordinate. Then, the
t-th row of U has ones only starting at index t + 1, and thus the t-th row of Uz
involves only the elements zt+1, . . . , zk. We thus have:
eTt U
 n∑
i=1,i 6=r
xi
 = k∑
j=t+1
n∑
i=1,i 6=r
xi,j
for t < k and eTkU = 0. Now e
T
t xr = xr,t, e
T
t lr = lr,t and e
T
t 1 = 1. Hence,
we therefore get the following where at row t, the right hand side involves only
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already computed values:
x1,k = 1− l1,k
xr,k = 1− lr,k +
r−1∑
i=1
xi,k if 1 < r ≤ n
x1,t = 1− l1,t +
k∑
j=t+1
n∑
i=2
xi,j if 1 ≤ t < k
xr,t = 1− lr,t +
r−1∑
i=1
xi,t +
k∑
j=t+1
n∑
i=1,i 6=r
xi,j if 1 ≤ t < k and 1 < r ≤ n
(4)
3.3.2 Efficient Algorithm.
To obtain all values, we have to apply the above Formula (4) for each 1 ≤ r ≤ n
and 1 ≤ t ≤ k, but we know that the bids also satisfy the following constraint:
there is a single non zero value, a one, per block of x of size k. Therefore, the last
Equation (4) can be replaced by the following choice:
• either the location of the bid for the r-th bidder, i.e. the non zero value in xr,
has already been found at step t. Then ∃t + 1 ≤ j0 ≤ k, xr,j0 = 1 and the
remaining part of xr is all zeroes, so that xr,t = 0.
• or ∀t+ 1 ≤ j ≤ k, xr,j = 0. Then the i 6= r can be removed in the last sum
of the formula and
xr,t = 1− lr,t +
r−1∑
i=1
xi,t +
k∑
j=t+1
n∑
i=1
xi,j .
From this remark, one sees that either we already know the xr,t value or it is
just 1−lr,t plus the sum of all the previously computed xi,j . Therefore to efficiently
compute all these values, it is sufficient to maintain a counter of the known values
as in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 1 is correct and its arithmetic cost can be bounded by
O(nk).
Proof. The correctness follows from the analysis in the beginning of this section.
Then for each entry in the output vector, we have to compute two additions, one
test and potentially a counter increment.
This is two orders of magnitude less than the number of operations required
just to compute all the encrypted bids.
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Algorithm 1 Bids recovery
Require: The lrt exponents of Y in the encryption of Brandt’s protocol, for 1 ≤
r ≤ n and 1 ≤ t ≤ k.
Ensure: The bids xrt satisfying Equations (4).
1: Let counter = 0;
2: for r = 1..n do
3: bidfound[r] = false;
4: end for
5: x1,k = 1− l1,k
6: if x1,k == 1 then
7: + + counter;
8: bidfound[1] = true;
9: end if
10: for r = 1..n do
11: xr,k = 1− lr,k + counter;
12: if xr,k == 1 then
13: + + counter;
14: bidfound[r] = true;
15: end if
16: end for
17: for t = k − 1 down to 1 do
18: if not bidfound[1] then
19: x1,t = 1− l1,t + counter;
20: if x1,t == 1 then
21: + + counter;
22: bidfound[1] = true;
23: end if
24: for r = 2..n do
25: if not bidfound[r] then
26: xr,t = 1− lr,t + counter;
27: if xr,t == 1 then
28: + + counter;
29: bidfound[r] = true;
30: end if
31: end if
32: end for
33: end if
34: end for
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3.4 Attack on the random noise: how to obtain the lij’s
In the previous section we showed that knowing the lij’s allows us the efficiently
break the privacy of all bidders. Here is how to obtain the lij’s. The seller will
learn all vij =
(
Y lij
)(∑nh=1mhij) at the end of the protocol. Since the mhij are ran-
domly chosen, this will be a random value if lij 6= 0. However a malicious bidder
(“Mallory”, of index a) can cancel out the mhij as follows: in Step 3 of the protocol
each bidder will compute his γaij and δ
a
ij . Mallory waits until all other bidders have
published their values (the protocol does not impose any synchronization or special
ordering) and then computes his values γωij and δ
ω
ij as:
γωij =
 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
αhd
 ·(j−1∏
d=1
αid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
αhj
) ·
∏
k 6=ω
γkij
−1
δωij =
 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
βhd
 ·(j−1∏
d=1
βid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
βhj
) ·
∏
k 6=ω
δkij
−1
The first part is a correct encryption of Y lij , with mωij = 1 for all i and j. The
second part is the inverse of the product of all the other bidders γkij and δ
k
ij , and thus
it will eliminate the random exponents. Hence after decryption the seller obtains
vij = Y
lij , where lij < n for a small n. He can compute lij by simply (pre-
)computing all possible values Y r and testing for equality. This allows the seller to
obtain the necessary values and then to use the resolution algorithm to obtain each
bidder’s bid. Note that although we changed the intermediate values, the output
still gives the correct result (i.e. winning bid). Therefore, the attack might even
be unnoticed by the other participants. Note also that choosing a different Yi per
bidder does not prevent the attack, since all the Yi need to be public in order to
prove the correctness of the bid in Step 2 of the protocol.
However the protocol requires Mallory to prove that γωij and δ
ω
ij have the same
exponent. This is obviously the case, but Mallory does not know the exact value
of this exponent. Thus it is impossible for him to execute the proposed zero-
knowledge protocol directly.
In the original paper [Bra06] the malleable interactive proof of [CP92], pre-
sented in Section 2.3, is used to prove the correctness of γaij and δ
a
ij in Step 3 of the
protocol. If this proof is not converted into a non-interactive proof, then Mallory is
able to fake it as follows.
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3.5 Proof of equality of the presented outcomes
Note that we can rewrite γωij and δ
ω
ij as:
v = γωij =
 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
αhd
 ·(j−1∏
d=1
αid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
αhj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g1
1−(∑k 6=ωmkij)
w = δωij =
 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
βhd
 ·(j−1∏
d=1
βid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
βhj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g2
1−(∑k 6=ωmkij)
When Mallory, the bidder m, is asked by Victor for a proof of correctness of his
values, he starts by asking all other bidders for proofs to initialize the man-in-the-
middle attack of Figure 1. Each of them answers with values λo = gzo1 and µo =
gzo2 . Mallory can then answer Victor with values λ =
∏
o λ
−1
o and µ =
∏
o µ
−1
o ,
where o ∈ ([1, n] \ m). Victor then sends a challenge c, which Mallory simply
forwards to the other bidders. They answer with ro = zo + c ·moij , and Mallory
sends r = c−∑o ro to Victor, who can check that gr1 = λ · vc and gr2 = µ ·wc. If
the other bidders did their proofs correctly, then Mallory’s proof will appear valid
to Victor:
λ · vc =
∏
o
λ−1o ·
(
g
1−(∑omoij)
1
)c
=
∏
o
g−zo1 · g
c−c(∑omoij)
1 = g
c−∑o(zo+cmoij)
1
µ · wc =
∏
o
µ−1o ·
(
g
1−(∑omoij)
2
)c
=
∏
o
g−zo2 · g
c−c(∑omoij)
2 = g
c−∑o(zo+cmoij)
2
Hence in the case of malleable interactive zero-knowledge proofs Mallory is able
to modify the values γωij and δ
ω
ij as necessary, and even prove the correctness using
the bidders. Hence the modifications may stay undetected and the seller will be
able to break privacy.
3.6 Efficiency of the attack
In order to measure the practicability of the attack we have implemented the proto-
col in C++ using the Givaro library2 for the large modular computations. We have
used a 32 cores shared memory Intel Xeon E5-4620 to simulate several bidders,
2http://givaro.forge.imag.fr/
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each core running at 2.2 GHz. The computations of the seller (namely the compu-
tation of the winner) and of Mallory, our attacker, have been performed on a single
core of this machine.
First we report on Table 1 our timings for a different number of bidders and
8192 different possible prices. The “Set-up” column represents the total time re-
quired to set-up Brandt’s protocol on our machine with 32 cores whereas the “Set-
up / bidder” column represent the time required for each bidder. On the one hand,
this shows that Brandt’s protocol requires quite a lot of computing time and that
as predicted by the arithmetic complexity, the set-up time can be quite resource
demanding for each bidder, as well as for the seller (“Winner computation” is done
by the seller). On the other hand, we see that both our attacks are even some orders
of magnitude faster than just setting up the protocol and that our novel attack re-
quires only a few seconds to break the privacy of realistic auctions (with hundreds
of bidders and thousands of prices).
Table 1: Parallel Brandt for 8192 bids with OpenMP on an Intel Xeon E5-4620,
32x2.2GHz
Bidders Bids Set-up Set-up / bidder Winner computation [DDL13] Attack Novel Attack
2 8192 80.354 s 80.354 s 0.454 s 0.100 s 0.001 s
4 8192 124.370 s 124.370 s 0.758 s 0.181 s 0.002 s
8 8192 219.641 s 219.641 s 1.768 s 0.594 s 0.004 s
16 8192 396.398 s 396.398 s 3.620 s 1.560 s 0.011 s
32 8192 1399.480 s 1399.480 s 16.945 s 4.601 s 0.043 s
64 8192 4181.830 s 2090.915 s 72.924 s 14.171 s 0.192 s
128 8192 14559.700 s 3639.925 s 420.497 s 54.200 s 0.664 s
256 8192 50546.800 s 6318.350 s 2942.650 s 173.255 s 2.910 s
Next we also show in the log scale Figure 3 that the arithmetic complexity
bounds given in Section 3.3.2 are indeed tight: quadratic in the number of bids and
bidders for the setting-up and the previous attack; only linear for the novel attack.
3.7 The complete attack and countermeasures
Putting everything together, the attack works as follows:
1. The bidders set up the keys as described in the protocol.
2. They encrypt and publish their bids.
3. They compute γhij and δ
h
ij and publish them.
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Figure 3: Parallel Brandt for 32 bidders with OpenMP on an Intel Xeon E5-4620,
32x2.2GHz
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4. Mallory, who is a bidder himself, waits until all other bidders have published
their values. He then computes his values as defined above, and publishes
them.
5. If he is asked for a proof, he can proceed as explained above in Section 3.5.
6. The bidders (including Mallory) jointly decrypt the values.
7. The seller obtains all Y lij ’s. He can then compute the lij’s by testing at most
n possibilities.
8. Once he has all values, he can invert the function f as explained above.
9. He obtains all bidders bids.
Again, note that for all honest bidders, this execution will look normal, so they
might not even notice that an attack took place. To prevent this attack, one could
perform the following actions:
• To counteract the removal of the noise of Section 3.4, the bidders could
check whether the product of the γai,j for all bidders a is equal to the product
of the αhd without any noise (exponent is 1). Unfortunately, the man-in-the-
middle attack generalizes to any exponent as shown in Figure 2. Therefore
the attacker could use a randomly chosen exponent only known to him.
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• As mentioned above, another countermeasure is the use of non-interactive,
non-malleable proofs of knowledge. In this case, we will show in Section 5
that it is still possible to attack a targeted bidder’s privacy.
4 Attacking verifiability
Brandt claims that the protocol is verifiable as the parties have to provide zero-
knowledge proofs for their computations, however there are two problems.
4.1 Exceptional values
First, a winning bidder cannot verify if he actually won. To achieve privacy, the
protocol hides all outputs of vaj except for the entry containing “1”3. This is done
by exponentiation with random values maij inside all entries γ
a
ij and δ
a
ij , i.e. by
computing x
∑
am
a
ij
ij where xij is the product of some αij as specified in the proto-
col. If xij = 1, for any k we have xkij = 1. For any other value of xij , x
k
ij should
be different from 1. However the random values maij may add up to zero (mod q),
hence the returned value will be x
∑
am
a
ij
ij = x
0
ij = 1 and the bidder will conclude
that he won, although he actually lost (xij 6= 1). Hence simply verifying the proofs
is not sufficient to be convinced that the observed outcome is correct. For the same
reason the seller might observe two or more “1”-values, even though all proofs are
correct. In such a situation he is unable to decide which bidder actually won since
he cannot determine which “1”s correspond to a real bids, and hence which bid is
the highest real bid. If two “1”s correspond to real bids, he could even exploit such
a situation to his advantage: he can tell both bidders that they won and take money
from both, although there is only one good to sell – this is normally prohibited by
the protocol’s tie-breaking mechanism. If the bidders do not exchange additional
data there is no way for them to discover that something went wrong, since the
seller is the only party having access to all values.
A solution to this problem could work as follows: when computing the γaij and
δaij , the bidders can check if the product
xij =
 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
αhd
 ·(j−1∏
d=1
αid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
αhj
)
is equal to one – if yes, they restart the protocol using different keys and random
values. If not, they continue, and check if
∏
a γ
a
ij = 1. If yes, they choose different
3Note that the protocol contains a mechanism to resolve ties, i.e. there should always be exactly
one entry equal to 1, even in the presence of ties.
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random values maij and re-compute the γ
a
ij and δ
a
ij , otherwise they continue. Since
the probability of the random values adding up to zero is low, this will rapidly lead
to correct values.
4.2 Different private keys
Second, the paper does not precisely specify the proofs that have to be provided
in the joint decryption phase. If the bidders only prove that they use the same
private key on all decryptions and not also that it is the one they used to generate
their public key, they may use a wrong one. This will lead to a wrong decryption
where with very high probability no value is “1”, as they will be random. Hence all
bidders will think that they lost, thus allowing a malicious bidder to block the whole
auction, as no winner is determined. Hence, if we assume that the verification test
consists in verifying the proofs, a bidder trying to verify that he lost using the
proofs might perform the verification successfully, although the result is incorrect
and he actually won – since he would have observed a “1” if the vector had been
correctly decrypted.
This problem can be addressed by requiring the bidders to also prove that they
used the same private key as in the key generation phase.
5 Attacks using the lack of authentication
The protocol as described in the original paper does not include any authentication
of the messages. This means that an attacker in control of the network can im-
personate any party, which can be exploited in many ways. However, the authors
supposed in the original paper a “reliable broadcast channel, i.e. the adversary
has no control of communication” [Bra06]. Yet even under this assumption dis-
honest participants can impersonate other participants by submitting messages on
their behalf. Additionally, this assumption is difficult to achieve in asynchronous
systems [FLP85]. In the following we consider an attacker in control of the net-
work, however many attacks can also be executed analogously by dishonest parties
(which are considered in the original paper) in the reliable broadcast setting.
5.1 Another attack on privacy
Our first attack on privacy only works in the case of malleable interactive proofs.
If we switch to non-interactive non-malleable proofs, Mallory cannot ask the other
bidders for proofs using a challenge of his choice.
However, even with non-interactive non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs, the
protocol is still vulnerable to attacks on a targeted bidder’s privacy if an attacker
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can impersonate any bidder of his choice as well as the seller, which is the case for
an attacker controlling the network due to the lack of authentication. In particular,
if he wants to know Alice’s bid he can proceed as follows:
1. Mallory impersonates all other bidders. He starts by creating keys on their
behalf and publishes the values yi and the corresponding proofs for all of
them.
2. Alice also creates her secret keyshare and publishes ya together with a proof.
3. Alice and Mallory compute the public key y.
4. Alice encrypts her bid and publishes herαaj and βbj together with the proofs.
5. Mallory publishes αij = αaj and βij = βaj for all other bidders i and also
copies Alice’s proofs.
6. Alice and Mallory execute the computations described in the protocol and
publish γaij and δ
a
ij .
7. They compute φaij and send it to the seller.
8. The seller publishes the φaij and computes the vaj .
Since all submitted bids are equal, the seller (which might also be impersonated
by Mallory) will obtain Alice’s bid as the winning price, hence it is not private any
more. This attack essentially simulates a whole instance of the protocol to make
Alice indirectly reveal a bid that was intended for another, probably real auction.
To counteract this it is not sufficient for Alice to check that the other bids are
different: Mallory can produce different αij = αajyx together with βij = βajgx
which are still correct encryptions of Alice bids.
Note that the same attack also works if dishonest bidders collude with the
seller: they simply re-submit the targeted bidders bid as their own bid.
5.2 Attacking fairness, non-repudiation and verifiability
The lack of authentication obviously entails that a winning bidder can claim that he
did not submit his bid, hence violating non-repudiation (even in the case of reliable
broadcast). Additionally, this also enables an attack on fairness: an attacker in
control of the network can impersonate all bidders vis-à-vis the seller, submitting
bids of his choice on their behalf and hence completely controlling the winner and
winning price. This also causes another problem with verifiability: it is impossible
to verify if the bids were submitted by the registered bidders, or by somebody else.
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5.3 Countermeasures
The solution to these problems is simple: all the messages need to be authenticated,
e.g. using signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs). This requires a
trust anchor, for example a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that verifies the identi-
ties of the participants and certifies their keys.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the protocol of Brandt [Bra06] from various angles. We
showed that the underlying computations have a weakness which can be exploited
by malicious bidders to break privacy if malleable interactive zero-knowledge proofs
are used. Using an implementation of the protocol and the attack we illustrated its
practical efficiency. We also identified two problems with verifiability and pro-
posed solutions. Finally we showed how the lack of authentication can be used
to mount different attacks on privacy, verifiability as well as fairness and non-
repudiation. Again we suggested a solution to address the discovered flaws.
So sum up, the following countermeasures have to be implemented:
• Use of non-interactive or non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs.
• All messages have to be authenticated, e.g. using a Public-Key Infrastructure
(PKI) and signatures.
• In the outcome computation step: when computing the γaij and δaij , the bid-
ders can check if
xij =
 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
αhd
 ·(j−1∏
d=1
αid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
αhj
)
is equal to one – if yes, they restart the protocol using different keys and
random values. If not, they continue, and check if
∏
a γ
a
ij = 1. If yes,
they choose different random values maij and re-compute the γ
a
ij and δ
a
ij ,
otherwise they continue.
• In the outcome decryption step: the bidders have to prove that the value xa
they used to decrypt is the same xa they used to generate their public key ya
in the first step.
The attacks show that properties such as authentication can be necessary to
achieve other properties like for instance privacy, which might appear to be unre-
lated at first sight. It also points out that there is a difference between computing the
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winner in a fully private way, and ensuring privacy for the bidders: in the second
attack we use modified inputs to break privacy even though the computations them-
selves are secure. Additionally our analysis highlights that the choice of interactive
or non-interactive, malleable or non-malleable proofs is an important decision in
any protocol design.
As for possible generalizations of our attacks, of course the linear algebra part
of our first attack is specific to this protocol. Yet the man-in-the-middle attack on
malleable proofs as well as the need of authentication for privacy are applicable to
any protocol. Similarly, checking all exceptional cases and ensuring that the same
keys are used all along the process are also valid insights for other protocols.
As future work we would like to realize a full formal security proof of the fixed
protocol.
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